This set of short opinion pieces on the way forward with our erstwhile friends the Paks makes for interesting reading. My take? All of them suggest we continue to put too much trust in the Pakistanis, largely for prudential reasons. OK. So what would I suggest? A serious application of the Bush Doctrine. Cowboy diplomacy with teeth:
This formally simple argument captures President Bush’s intent back in 2001:
1. Those who knowingly give material support and safe haven to our barbarian enemy will be made to feel significant and sustained negative consequences for giving that support unless and until the material support ceases. The means we will utilize and the intensity of negative consequences inflicted will be determined by our estimation of the likelihood the means under consideration will attain their ends; cessation of material support. We reserve the right to wage war as one such means. What is more, we are morally and legally permitted to do so, as long as we honor the tradition with regard to killing civilian populations and non-combatant immunity.
2. When attacked in 2001 we had already been aware that OBL/AQ was being given support and safe haven by Taliban Afghanistan. The attacks made apparent to us the Taliban led Afghan government had knowingly been aiding him while he planned and carried out attacks on our country.
3. The Taliban government was made to feel significant consequences for their material support of the barbarian until the material support ceased. We waged war upon them because no other option offered realistic prospects of ending the material support. We continue to wage war upon them. Their hold on the reigns of state ceased. Their ability to provide material support to groups that are our enemies has been degraded but still exists. The possibility still exists that they could regain the reins of power in Afghanistan. If we were to precipitously leave, that probability would increase to a degree unacceptable. We continue to diminish that ability through continued military action and other means. We will not leave Afghanistan until we deem it either impossible or very unlikely that conditions will revert to the 2001 state of affairs with regard to Afghan aid to the barbarian.
This is a simple argument, roughly following the valid form modus ponens,
or in the Aristotelian tradition, the syllogism form “Barbara.”
One can construct an analogous argument in regard to Pakistan circa 2011:
1. Those who knowingly give material support and safe haven to our barbarian enemy will be made to feel significant and sustained negative consequences for giving that support unless and until the material support ceases. The means we will utilize and the intensity of negative consequences inflicted will be determined by our estimation of the likelihood the means under consideration will attain their ends; cessation of material support. We reserve the right to wage war as one such means. What is more, we are morally and legally permitted to do so, as long as we honor the tradition with regard to civilian populations and non-combatant immunity.___________________________________________________________________________
2. When attacked in 2001 we had already been aware that OBL/AQ was being given support and safe haven by Pakistani Taliban and elements of the Pakistani government (military, the ISI). Subsequent intelligence, arrests and CIA led actions have made it apparent to us the Pakistani government has for at least 6 year knowingly been aiding OBL/AQ while he planned and carried out attacks on our country.
3. The Pakistani government will be made to feel significant consequences for their material support of the barbarian until the material support ceases. We reserve the right to wage war if no other option offers realistic prospects of ending the material support. In that event, we will continue to wage war upon them until their ability to provide material support to groups that are our enemies has been eliminated or seriously degraded. We will not cease until we deem it either impossible or very unlikely that conditions will revert to the 2011 state of affairs with regard to aid to the barbarian.
Notice; the second argument, like the Afghan version ‘reserves the right’ to wage war. This indicates that war is not the option of first resort. As with the Afghans of 2001, the argument states that alternatives will be explored, and if they fail to produce, war can be initiated. What non-war options exist? They are explored in the NYT pieces. (And we cannot move forward without a reminder that some of them have been tried, and failed):
A first, and non-starter, is to conduct business as usual with Pakistan, tolerating the odd sacrificial lamb offered us, in fear that a complete severance of relationship would somehow leave us worse off than if we knowingly continue to go along with their double game.
Such toleration in the past was morally problematic. Such toleration today would be morally odious. Such tolerance today would indicate to the Pakistanis that the people of the United States are willing to continue in tolerance of the double game in full knowledge that all along Pakistan had been hiding OBL while protesting they had no idea where he was. This is simply unacceptable. It sticks in the craw. To coin a phrase; it is to play the “weak horse” in a part of the world that despises the weak horse.
All worry about control of nukes and cutting off supposedly valuable intel and military aid, and hand wringing about the Pakistani government falling into the hands of Islamists simply doesn’t wash in the face of this glaring insult. We already have a Pakistani government that, if not in the hands of Islamists, is at least partially in control of sympathizers. At best, we get partial and cherry-picked intel and military aid. No doubt they provide similar aid to our barbarian enemy. They play both sides. We cannot be perceived as accepting this any longer.
We have tolerated a double dealing partner that takes tens of billions from us each year. There is not now, nor have we ever had a regime of robust accountability concerning use of these funds, nor have we any real idea how or to whom the funds are distributed. We open our coffers, and dump the money into their coffers. We trust them, or tolerate them. We do not check.
It is likely if not certain that we have funded the double game. This means we gave funding for the killing of our own people in Afghanistan. This should not continue.
What is more, we cannot assure ourselves that any well intentioned aid we give for civil or humanitarian purposes in Pakistan will actually be used for those purposes. What is more, even if it is so used, this frees up Pakistani domestic funds for the double game. If they are not paying for schools and libraries because we are, they can use their own money elsewhere.
Also, consider this: Even if our funding does produce schools and other civilian infrastructure, we cannot expect that the Pakistani government will conspicuously give us credit for the aid. Rather, we can expect that it will continue to feed its deeply conspiratorial populace anti-American propaganda from its left hand as it takes our money with its open right hand.
It is obvious from the track record that we cannot rely on the Pakistanis to police themselves with regard to use of our aid. If we are to continue to give such aid, we will have to police them. This is impracticable.
It is evident that we cannot rely on Pakistani promises, verbal or written.
Therefore: we cannot continue to give aid unless we are given a legitimate accountability. Not vague promises, but actual accountability that we can verify beyond any reasonable doubt.
So; the proper reaction to the present state of affairs is to curtail aid until this level of reassurance is given, and a regime is in place to provide it. I would suspect that this would require that we have people in the country that can vigorously pursue verification, without any hindrance.
It is not up to us to suggest an accountability regime for the Pakistanis. It is up to them to offer one. If it looks to be practicable for us, we can consider provisional reinstatement of a significantly smaller amount of aid than we presently give. If after a trial period, the accountability regime satisfies us, we can increase aid after a 2 year period, along with a requisite increased level of accountability. If, on the other hand, after that provisional period, the accountability regime does not satisfy us, we will permanently discontinue aid.
If the Pakistanis choose to forgo the aid, we will not protest. However, we will maintain a significant presence in Afghanistan, and will be positioned to take military action if the material aid to the barbarian continues. We reserve the right to undertake such actions at any time, and without notice.
In that circumstance, we will also enforce the Afghan Pakistan border in a more vigorous fashion, in a way similar to how Iraq was treated during the 90s. Any attacks on our aircraft or personnel will be considered an act of war. We will respond, and not in a piecemeal fashion.
We will also cultivate our significantly more reciprocal relationship with India, a country not only politically and economically more congenial, but more ideologically akin. We will leverage that partnership vigorously. We will make this very apparent to the Pakistanis. Any attack on India will be considered an attack on an ally.
We will make apparent to the Pakistanis, in regard to use of nuclear weapons against allies or ourselves, that a policy of overwhelming response will be followed. We will also make contingency plans to secure the nuclear weapons if the Pakistani state fails.
With regard to any AQ enemy within the borders of Pakistan, we will, in any eventuality, reserve the right to military action against them at any time. Any resistance offered by the Pakistani military will be firmly met. Diplomatic protests will be tolerated.
Last observation: the argument has focused, as it should, on the Pakistani state, which, troublingly, like all states, is a reflection of the Pakistani people.
I can imagine Sherman asking this exit question: Given the deeply ingrained anti-Americanism, and the propensity to cheer from the safe confines of the "sidelines" is the Pakistani population not unlike the well-heeled Southern gentry of my day, who needed to feel the hardships of war?
Will it in fact be necessary in the longer run of things to (in the phrasing of the argument)"inflict significant and sustained negative consequences" for the purposes of extirpating the will to give that support?
No doubt, Sherman would hasten to add this does not entail killing civilians as we did in Japan and Germany. No. But it may eventuate that they need to be made uncomfortable, distressed, and burdened by their continued moral support for our barbarian enemy.
Are we willing to do this? And how exactly would we do this? What is more, how would this approach square with the 'hearts and minds' approach? Indeed, can they be applied concurrently? I suspect the answer is yes.
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